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Abstract—With the rapid growth of the Internet, there are an 
increasing number of computer threats and attacks. The 
prevalence of zero-day attack activities has given rise to the 
need to prevent these attack activities from spreading and 
damaging the computer system. As such, intrusion detection 
system (IDS) should satisfy complex requirements and must be 
durable, manageable and reliable.  In this paper, we developed 
an anomaly-based detection model using a statistical method 
combined with a binary logistic regression approach. The 
model, Layer based Anomaly Detection (LbAD) is designed to 
detect remote to user (R2L) and user to root (U2R) attacks by 
statistically examining the degree of normal field values within 
three layer (data link, network, transport) of OSI Seven Layer.  
The results of the new method outperform the leading existing 
methods. 
Keywords—Anomaly Based Detection System; remote to 
local; user to root; binary logistic regression; 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Information security is one of the most important aspects 
in modern daily life. Many computer users are unaware of 
the fact that they might be exposed to risks and threats. 
Along with the continuous growth and high-speed 
development of the Internet technologies, widely available 
sensitive information makes the network environment 
becomes even more complex. Although the Internet brings 
convenience and real-time service to users, there are issues 
that can compromise confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) [1]. Many servers have been attacked and 
paralysed, many of them suffering from lost of information. 
In such cases, the impact can be a huge loss in terms of 
money, data and business availability. According to the FBI 
and the US-CERT, most exploits come from software 
vulnerability. The US-CERT National Vulnerability 
Database, reveals an average of 13 new vulnerabilities were 
reported daily in 2013, resulting in 4,794 vulnerabilities in 
that year alone, approximately 26.6% more than the number 
of flaws found in 2011. 
The main focus of network security is on access control, 
firewall and information encryption. However, there are 
common issues related to bugs and deficiencies. For 
instance, a firewall alone is unable to detect inside intrusion 
[3], and therefore intrusion detection has become a popular 
option. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is one of the 
components in the security arsenal “defense in depth” [4], 
and acts as a compliment to the existing security appliances. 
Although there is no guarantee on security, when it is 
integrated with other security measures such as vulnerability 
assessments, data encryption, user authentication, access 
control, and firewalls, IDS can greatly enhance the network 
security. A major interest in defending a computer system is 
protection from exploits by intruders using zero-day attacks. 
A zero-day attacks are one that occurs when a hitherto 
unknown vulnerability is first discovered at the same time as 
the exploit [5]. An IDS is used to assist security analysts to 
detect and analyse the zero-day attacks. Since the attack is 
unknown, traditional signature-based approaches cannot be 
used. With that notion in mind, anomaly-based detection will 
be used in this research. 
Intrusion Detection System 
An IDS can be described as a device or an application 
that detects malicious activities or policy violations in a 
network. IDSs are considered not only as a part of 
surveillances, but also of network security. An IDS analyses 
captured traffic and triggers an alarm when signs of 
intrusions are detected, alerting the administrator for further 
action.  
An IDS can be classified as either a host-based IDS 
(HIDS) or a network-based IDS (NIDS) [6], [7]. The 
classification is based upon the location of where the IDS is 
deployed to inspect suspicious traffic. NIDS captures the 
whole network segment and analyses it to identify signs of 
hostile traffic. HIDS focuses on a specific host and analyses 
information such as system calls, logs, and packets. In that 
manner, HIDS is more appropriate in helping to identify 
internal attacks compared to NIDS [8].  
Detection methods of IDS are divided into two types i.e. 
signature-based detection systems (known as knowledge-
based detection) and anomaly-based detection systems 
(known as behaviour-based detection) [9]. Signature-based 
detection systems (SBDS) use pre-define rules that are 
previously stored in the database to detect attacks of known 
types. However, SBDSs also have its drawbacks due to it 
being solely dependent on regular signature updates, and 
cannot detect an unknown or new attacks [10] and thus such 
attacks may pass through the system. Anomaly-based 
detection systems (ABDS) are effective in detecting 
unknown attacks, and are based on behaviour analysis to 
establish a baseline of normal usage patterns. Anything that 
deviates widely from normal usage gets flagged as a possible 
intrusion [11]. This method is capable of detecting unknown 
attacks. However, anomaly based detection systems do have 
the drawback of raising more false alarms than signature-
based detection systems [12]. A false alarm is an event 
where normal traffic is flagged as abnormal and an alarm is 
incorrectly triggered. The main focus in anomaly-based IDS 
is to design high detection and prediction with an acceptable 
number of false alarms. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PHAD) has attracted 
the attention of numerous researchers [9], [13], [14], [15], 
[16]. In PHADs, packet characteristics and behaviours are 
used to identify unusual behavior. Normal packet behaviour 
is used to construct a normal profile, and then subsequent 
behaviour can be compared to this profile. Packets with 
characteristics and behaviours that differ significantly from 
the normal profile are considered to be anomalous packets. 
PHAD systems consider only packet header information 
rather than using IP addresses and port numbers [15]. It 
extracts values of 33 packet header fields that consist of 
packet information from layer 2 to layer 4 of the OSI 7 layers 
of the OSI model. PHAD systems calculate the probability of 
anomaly against each packet header field from the training 
session. Each field from testing data is compared to the 
training set data; if there is any dissimilarity detected 
anomaly score will be given. The total anomaly score of a 
packet are summed and the packet is classified as anomalous 
if the total score exceeds a defined threshold. This approach 
claimed to detect 72 attacks instance out of 201 inside 
DARPA dataset [15].  
Unlike traditional PHAD systems, the Protocol-based 
Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PbPHAD) is 
implemented as host-based and network-based IDS [16]. In 
PbPHAD, the distinct value of normal behavior is used to 
create a profile that is based on three main protocols ICMP, 
TCP and UDP. As in traditional PHADs, these systems use 
statistics calculated from 33 packet header fields to produce 
the anomaly score. PbPHAD focuses on discovering the 
degree of incoming anomalous packets, which are 
individually rated with an anomaly score. Despite the fact 
that PbPHAD outperforms PHAD and the previously 
benchmarked DARPA Best Systems [14], the attack 
detection rate was only 57.83%.  
Packet Analysis Anomaly Intrusion Detection (PAID) 
performs packet analysis in detecting intrusion [13]. 
Compared to PHAD and PbPHAD, PAID approaches use 
feature extraction and Bayesian analysis where packet 
features are transformed from continuous to discrete values 
before being fed into a Naïve Bayes Classifier. The classifier 
then categorises packets as benign or malicious. PAID 
systems focus on detecting DoS attacks and have an 
accuracy rate of just over 90%. However, the focus on DoS 
attacks makes PAID unsuitable for discovery of other types 
of attack. 
In this research, the DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection 
Data Set [14] has been chosen for evaluation. This data set is 
publicly available and was prepared by MIT Lincoln Lab. 
We are conscious of imperfection of DARPA dataset 
especially on the maturity over 15 years, but these are the 
most comprehensive and extensive used dataset in this field 
where we can easily make comparison with other researchers 
[18], [19], [20], [21], [22], and [23] since it has been 
accepted as standard benchmark for their IDS model. 
Lincoln Lab has provided 5 weeks of data that consist of 3 
weeks of training data and 2 weeks of testing data in various 
formats such as tcpdump, NT audit data, and BSM solaris 
host audit data. For this research, tcpdump format has been 
chosen since it provides details of TCP/IP packet 
information for intrusion analysis. For the first and third 
week of training data, the data is free from any attacks, and 
this used to define normal traffic,  suitable for training of 
anomaly-based IDS systems; the second week of training 
data contains labeled attacks. The testing data, consists of 
two weeks of network based attacks in the midst of normal 
background data. There are 201 attack instances of 56 
different types distributed throughout the data. Of the 201 
attack instances, only 176 attack instances are detected by 
the inside sniffer and it is this that is used by Shamsuddin 
[16]. For our experimentation we consider the same 176 
attack instances. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Our method is a network-based approach where the 
normal profile is developed based on the behavior of normal 
traffic packet headers at layer 2, 3 and 4 of the OSI 7 Layer 
model. This approach is designed to detect abnormal 
behavior by identifying the degree of normality packets from 
the sum of individually rated normal field values. In this 
experiment we used MySQL as database management 
system and SPSS statistical software for statistical data 
analysis.  
The principal design concept behind this research was to 
learn the normal packet header attribute values during the 
attack free week 3 of data. The normal traffic, consisting of 
12,814,738 traffic packets, was used to develop the normal 
profile. In creating the normal profile, we indexed each 
attribute as, i= 1,2, …, n, and the model was built based on 
the ratio of the normal number of distinct field values in the 
training data, Ri, against the total number of packets 
associated with each attribute, Ni. The ratio, Pi=Ri/Ni 
represents the probability of normal score for each attribute 
field.  
    
Weighted Score 
We performed group attributes within its own 
corresponding layer and performed weighted score rules to 
make each attribute fairly distributed. The weight score rules 
were based on the total attributes that were associated with 
the specified layer. For instance, in layer 2, we had 6 
attributes and it gave a weighted value of 6/33, which was 
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The equation can be simplified into,  
 
where p is the probability of attack (0) when p<0.5 and 
normal (1), when  p>0.5. 
Table 2: Variables in the equation of week 4 R2L attack 
 
Table 3: Variables in the equation of week 5 R2L attack 
 
  
Table 2 and 3 summarised the descriptive statistics and 
analysis results in detecting R2L attack. Out of the three 
predictor variables, only two were statistically significant i.e. 
Layer 3 and Layer 4.  Both Layer 3 and Layer 4 were 
positively and significantly correlated in detecting outliers. 
In contrast, Layer 2 (Data Link Layer) statistically showed 
negative correlation, showing that Layer 2 was not 
contributing in detecting anomalous traffic. An R2L attack 
happens when there is an attempt made from outside network 
that tries to gain inside local access - the Layer 2 information 
did not contribute much in detecting this type of attacks. 
 
Table 4: Variables in the equation of week 4 U2R attack 
 
 
 
Table 5: Variables in the equation of week 5 U2R attack 
 
  
On the other hand, from table 4 and 5, it shows that out 
of three predictor variables, Layer 2 (Data Link Layer) gave 
the highest contribution in detecting U2R attack as compared 
to Layer 3 and Layer 4. A U2R attack is triggered when an 
attempt is made from a local user trying to get root access, 
this is considered as an internal attack. For this reason, the 
Layer 2 information was of great significance in detecting 
U2R attacks. To evaluate the performance of the proposed 
method, the detected anomalous packets were then compared 
against the 176 attack instances provided in the MIT Lincoln 
Lab data [25]. The performance was evaluated based on 
attack instances detected.  
 
Table 6: Detection Results of R2L attacks on Week 4 and 
Week 5 
 
 
Table 7: Comparison between 1999 DARPA Best System, 
PbPHAD and Proposed Model on poorly detected attacks on 
R2L 
 
……(2) 
……(3) 
Table 8: Detection Results of U2R attacks on Week 4 and 
Week 5 
 
 
 
Table 9: Comparison between 1999 DARPA Best System, 
PbPHAD and Proposed Model on poorly detected attacks on 
U2R
 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of U2R and R2L attack detected by 
three different methods. 
 
Table 10: False Positive rate for both R2L and U2R attack 
over week 4 and week 5 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Our LbAD model has shown to be a very promising 
model to be used in anomaly based detection systems. The 
experiment was conducted by statistically analysing the 
degree of normal field values inside three layers of the OSI 7 
layer model (data link, network, transport) and a binary 
logistic algorithm was performed to find a correlation 
between the layers. The DARPA 1999 dataset has been used 
to identify two types of attack, R2L, and U2R. Based on the 
correlation results from SPSS, it showed that layers 3 and 4 
contributed significantly to the detection of R2L attacks 
while Layer 2 and 4 contributed significantly to the detection 
of U2R attacks. Thus we can design our next model by only 
taking into account the most significant contributing layer or 
layers, so that the processing time will be shorter. The 
experimental results shows that our approach resulted on 
high detection rates on both type of attack with 84% on R2L 
and 93.5% on U2R. Our analysis showed that our approach 
managed to detect 15 out of 19 R2L attacks, and 11 out of 13 
U2R attacks and compared favourably to the detection rate 
of current algorithms. In this respect, our approach indicated 
an improvement of 42.11% and 46.15% over PbPHAD, for 
R2L and U2R respectively [16]. However, false positive rate 
for both R2L and U2R attack was still high with weekly 
average of 16.5% for R2L and 16.75% for U2R. 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
By implementing statistical analysis alone, it has been 
found that it was possible to produce higher detection rate, 
but in contrast it also came with a high percentage of false 
positive rates. Thus, future work will continue to working 
on discovering data mining algorithm techniques [26] that 
can help to reduce the number of false positive into 
acceptable rate when combined with statistical analysis. 
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